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Abstract 
 
What place does the caste system have in modern India with its globally-integrating market economy? 
The most influential anthropological approaches to caste have tended to emphasize caste as India’s 
traditional religious and ritual order, or (treating such order as a product of the colonial encounter) as 
shaped politically, especially today by the dynamics of caste-based electoral politics. Less attention has 
been paid to caste effects in the economy. This article argues that the scholarly framing of caste mirrors 
a public policy ‘enclosure’ of caste in the non-modern realm of religion and ‘caste politics’, while 
aligning modernity to the caste-erasing market economy. Village-level fieldwork in south India finds a 
parallel public narrative of caste either as ritual rank eroded by market relations, or as identity politics 
deflected from everyday economic life. But locally and nationally the effects of caste are found to be 
pervasive in labour markets and the business economy. In the age of the market, caste is a resource, 
sometimes in the form of a network, its opportunity-hoarding advantages discriminating against others. 
Dalits are not discriminated by caste as a set of relations separate from economy, but by the very 
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economic and market processes through which they often seek liberation. The caste processes, enclosures 
and evasions in post-liberalization India, suggest the need to rethink the modernity of caste beyond 
orientalist and postcolonial frameworks, and consider the presuppositions that shape understanding of an 
institution, the nature and experience of which are determined by the inequalities and subject positions 
it produces. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
What do we learn about the Indian caste system if we begin, not with ‘traditional’ Hindu 
religious ideas or contemporary political competition, but with relations of the modern 
economy, a domain in which caste identity and hierarchy is often understood to be absent, or 
eroded by market processes? In this article, I want to draw attention to a growing body of 
research which has precisely this focus, and consider the implications of this evidence for how 
we conceptualize caste as a contemporary phenomenon in Indian society and economy. This is 
especially important because of contention surrounding the social transformation attributed to 
India’s rapid economic growth, and the significance of caste in shaping new opportunity or 
new inequality. But before turning to the recent evidence on caste and the market economy (in 
Part 2 of this essay), I have another question, namely why has this dimension of caste received 
so little attention, or maybe active inattention. 
A few years ago, I began a collaborative project titled ‘Caste Out of Development’.2 Apart 
from the obvious reference to a kind of social exclusion, this signalled what I had observed as 
the discursive exclusion of caste from policy-framing in international development. I became 
interested in how a phenomenon so ubiquitous an aspect of socio-economic and political  life 
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could disappear from view within certain discursive fields, in this case development policy. 
Why is caste, which for a large section of humanity is at least as pervasive as gender, race, age, 
religion or other dimensions of human inequality and discrimination, absent from global policy 
debate and its intergovernmental platforms such as the Sustainable Development Goals? 
The purpose of Part 1 of this essay is to understand what bounds the discursive space for 
public debate on caste, especially in relation to the market economy. I should be clear that here 
‘caste’ is not a transhistorical social category, but refers to any of a wide variety of phenomena 
including the identity of endogamous groups (jatis) or clusters of them, a division of labour, a 
social classification, the attribution of inherent or cultural difference, a public representation 
of social rank, a network, a set of values, social judgements or discriminations (of people, 
spaces, markets, practices), an administrative or legal category, among others. Caste is an 
effect, perhaps of inequality, exclusion, discrimination or opportunity hoarding, and especially 
which produces a social cleavage between Dalits (the ‘untouchables’) and others. Polyvalent 
‘caste’ moreover exists only in relation to, or as an aspect of, other social relations or 
transactions such as of gender, class, employment, markets, electoral politics (etc.), made 
salient in specific contexts which might be characterized as rural or urban, industrial, 
commercial or institutional (of education, law, religion), or in discourses of policy or politics. 
Modern caste is not one thing, but neither is it anything. It is a clustered set of social phenomena 
and effects, recognized and spoken of as ‘caste’, brought to attention or concealed. My focus 
is on when and in what form caste is made visible or invisible. 
What I will suggest is that investment in a contemporary arrangement of categories (with its 
own history) that distinguishes religion, politics and market-economy, or tradition and 
modernity, serves to organize attention and inattention to caste processes in public narratives; 
and in particular that the modern market economy is a field in which the pervasive effects of 
caste are rendered invisible in ways that may serve selected interests by concealing processes 
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of advantage and discrimination. The narratives of caste and economy that I will draw attention 
to relate to knowledge present or institutionalized in different fields: in scholarship, in social 
policy and in Indian village life, which I take in turn. 
 
 
Part 1 Invisibilizing caste economics: the enclosure of caste in religion and politics 
 
 
 
Caste in scholarship: religion, politics and economy 
 
 
 
The question of what makes caste appear or disappear from view is not new. Indeed, a 
considerable part of anthropological scholarship on caste over the past half-century has been 
given over precisely to debating the conditions of knowledge about caste. In his ambitious 
book, Homo Hierarchicus, Louis Dumont (1980) insisted that the reality of caste could only 
be known at the ideological level, the empirical multitude of in-marrying groups or jatis 
acquiring coherence in terms of the complementary hierarchy of ‘the pure’ and ‘the impure’ 
which as a pre-eminent value ‘encompassed’ matters of power and politics, just as Brahman 
priesthood hierarchically encompassed Kshatriya rulership in the ancient varna classification. 
The reality of caste was not to be grasped in the realm of politics or economics. 
Critics of this ontological rendering of caste folded into Brahmanic ideology were no less 
insistent that caste came into reality as an ideological effect reordering a complex empirical 
reality, but this time – as Nicholas Dirks sets out in his book Castes of Mind (2001) – an effect 
of the British colonial system of knowledge that produced caste as India’s ‘traditional’ religious 
and ritual order. Dirks maintained that caste became the quintessential colonial idea of Indian 
civil society through the imposition of an orientalist idea onto diverse forms of identity and 
community, masking the true ‘political struggle and processes’ of caste as a product of the 
colonial encounter (Dirks 2001, 11). 
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While nationalist notions of Indian civilization continued to locate caste in the Hindu 
religious system, with its archetypal victims (the polluted ‘untouchables’) subject to Gandhian 
reform, or social mobility construed as ritual emulation or ‘Sanskritization’ (Rawat and 
Satyanarayana 2016, 10), a postcolonial sensibility has drawn caste (in its public form) 
primarily into a framework of ‘politics,’ reaching its ‘apotheosis’ (Dirks 2001, 6) with debates 
over the state’s affirmative action ‘quotas’, and the dynamics of caste-based electoral politics. 
Secularized and horizontalized by liberal democracy, caste reappears no longer as a system but 
with a new core characteristic as competing ethnic-like or cultural identities (Gupta 2005), 
entrenched and reproduced by electoral dynamics or caste-based ‘quotas’, sometimes criticized 
as a colonial legacy (Rawat and Satyanarayana 2016, 13). 
If I want to claim that caste, first enclosed within ‘religion’, is now enclosed within ‘politics’, 
it is only possible to do so with reference to a third category, the ‘economic’. Dumont’s use of 
religion (that is Hindu ideology) was challenged because it was seen as a category of analysis 
of Indian society produced by colonial claims about the Western modernity of the public 
domain of politics that rendered caste as Hindu religious tradition, denying its politics. What I 
am suggesting here is that an enclosure of caste within politics is, in parallel, an effect of 
contemporary (neoliberal) claims to the modernity of the market economy, which renders caste 
a matter of politics by denying caste economics. Unlike Brahmanic or Orientalist ideological 
effects that make caste visible, economic knowledge (and derivatively development discourse) 
makes caste phenomena disappear through discursive exclusion. 
The question of how this might be so takes us back to Dumont, not to his oft-challenged 
separation of the religious from the political, but his separation of the sphere of the ‘economic 
modern’ (in India no less regarded a product of colonial rule) as the categorical opposite of 
caste society. Dumont insists that from a caste-system viewpoint economics as a separate 
category (and value) does not exist since resource rights are only complementary parts of   an 
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ordered whole that is religious (1980, 164–66). In his later work, Dumont (1977) develops the 
implication, namely that peculiarly modern economic values (with individual property rights, 
land and labour as marketable commodities etc.) are incompatible with a holistic system such 
as caste.3 
Dumont (1977) is far from alone in paying attention to the conditions of existence of 
‘economy’ as a peculiar social, ethical and discursive domain. He follows Karl Polanyi (1957) 
in seeing the thought/value of ‘economics’ rising in late-seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Europe, when relations between people and things (wealth and property) were no longer 
subordinated to relations between people (the political), and when exchange was newly viewed 
as volitional and mutually advantageous, leading to the conception of an economic system with 
laws and morality of its own, ‘a self-contained sphere, distinct from the social, the cultural, and 
other spheres’ (Mitchell 1998, 91). Others, such as Kalpagam (2000) find in British colonial 
India – its systems of private property, practices of measurement and standardization, 
accounting and statistical analysis (etc.) – both the administration of an economy and 
maintenance of ‘a discourse of “the economy”’ (2000: 430). 
Birla (2011, 2008) takes two further significant steps, first showing how from the late- 
nineteenth century the British introduced a legal infrastructure that institutionalized ‘the 
market’, disembedded from earlier social arrangements and now standing in for ‘the public’ 
and comprised of colonial subjects governed (and ‘civilized’) as economic agents and 
consumers (i.e., by principles, rules and relations of contract). Second, Birla argues that this 
‘market governance’ and its modern abstraction, ‘the economy’, required that the excluded 
 
3 Dumont’s argument (at the level of values) is that in modern individualist society there is no logical 
 
alternative to the ideology of market economics. Only under totalitarianism, he insists, would the autonomy of 
the economic be displaced, and social subordination and hierarchy be reproduced within the market economy 
(Dumont 1977, 107; Rosen 1978, 213). 
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socialities of economic life – the negotiable codes of kinship, caste, trust or honour of 
‘vernacular capitalism’ – were re-coded as ‘culture’; as the ‘private’ to the market’s ‘public’, 
stabilized under scripted logics of religious-personal law, and preserved as custom through the 
post-1859 colonial policy of ‘non-interference’ (2011, 1023–25). In short, colonial liberalism 
which abstracted or disembedded ‘the economy’, re-wrote ‘the social’ as the market and in 
doing so placed relations of caste (and kinship) in a non-market protected domain of religion 
and culture, institutionalizing a disjucture between the spheres of the economic-public and the 
cultural-private (2011, 1031). As Birla (invoking Dumont) puts it, ‘colonial law grappled with 
the embeddedness of vernacular capitalism by casting Homo aequalis (economic man) as the 
public actor and Homo hierarchicus, his private cultural counterpart, as his effect’ (2010, 94). 
The idea of a distinct, or antecedent, precolonial Indian caste society separate from 
monetized market economy is of course demonstrably false (see Fuller 1989), and the argument 
that Indian villages (the classic locus of caste tradition) have for centuries been integrated into 
this economy through trade and commerce no longer needs to be made. But the dichotomy of 
caste tradition and market modernity that made those arguments necessary (outliving the 
separation of non-monetary and monetary exchange) persists in the idea that ultimately it is the 
modern market economy that will ensure that caste itself is but an incompatible fading 
residuum. Indeed, even Marxist historians such as Irfan Habib, who supply much of the 
evidence against Dumont’s premise (Habib 1982 in Fuller 1989) and conceive the history of 
caste in terms of its economic base, conclude that the modern economy (industrial 
development, or the commercialization of agriculture) has so shaken the traditional hereditary 
division of labour that caste survives only in its religious and personal aspects that Dumont is 
criticized for privileging (2002, 164, 178). And F. G. Bailey (1957) who was among those 
anthropologists who regarded caste as a system of village political and economic organization 
saw  access  to  new  commercial  activity  beyond  land,  and  the  introduction  of  the   state 
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administration, as eroding the politico-economic function of caste. Caste was a necessarily 
localized structure, engaged with a new ‘economic frontier’ (in Bailey’s 1950s rural India). 
Caste either ‘canalized’ forces of economic change into its own system or, by trying to inhibit 
these forces destroyed itself (1957, 269–71). To adapt Hirschman’s (1982) triad of rival 
interpretations of market society in Europe (from the eighteenth century), it could further be 
said: that the market and its demand for respectful mutual utility civilizes caste as an archaic 
system of honour and prejudice; or that the individual self-interest of market capitalism 
corrodes caste as traditional moral value; or that caste persists as a pre-capitalist remnant 
obstructing capitalist development. Always in opposition, caste is never integral to modern 
market economy. 
A more recent focus has been on the effect of the economy, or economics, as a discourse 
(and this in part is Dumont’s point) in relation to caste; and this takes two forms. On the one 
hand, economics (and ‘the market’) is an ideology or a representation abstracted from actual 
socio-cultural relationships (including those in markets) as the ‘virtual’ world of economists 
(Miller 2002) misconstruing the actual social (and caste) embeddedness of economic relations. 
On the other, economics is performative, its models effecting self-fulfilling re-arrangements, 
dissociations, or the social ‘disentanglement’ of agents necessary for markets to exist – that is, 
for the alienation, possession and exchange of commodities or services (Callon 1998; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007; Slater 2002). In this sense ‘[t]he economy’ as Timothy 
Mitchell argues, is a representation (perhaps of mechanical flows) that is made true through a 
new field of practices of planning, regulation or development management (1998); while 
economics itself is a science that ‘helps make of the wider world places where its facts can 
survive’ (Mitchell 2008, 1119). 
These two perspectives entail each other. The ‘framing’ Callon refers to as necessary for 
market exchange, is not a given but requires work, investment and a kind of ‘staging’ of social 
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‘disentanglements’ that are contingent, unstable, that cross agent networks and are separated 
from life outside the market by boundaries that are negotiable (Slater 2002). Moreover, actual 
markets work only through specific cultural entanglements and social categorizations including 
those of caste (see below) (2002, 247; Miller 2002). A market framing of actors and their 
relationships is thus not disembedded from caste relations; but in fact becomes part of the 
renegotiation of caste (both erased and reasserted). But as a representational domain, the 
market economy involves a constitutive exclusion of closely aligned relations of caste, gender 
and family, as part of the ‘non-economic’ upon which, of course, the economic nonetheless 
depends to reproduce labour or access to markets (Mitchell 1998, 99). Caste characterized by 
this ‘exclusion-yet-dependence’ (1998, 99) is both changed and disguised in a pervasive 
market-economy common sense. Caste has indeed become tradition in relation to the modern 
economy, or the pre-capitalist in relation to the capitalist, culture in relation to economy, 
private to public, or as that into which economic relations are ‘socially embedded’ (as 
Granovetter [1985] and others suggest) but which, Mitchell (2008) points out, presumes an 
actual realm of pure economic actors and processes with social identity/location-less buyer- 
seller exchanges, when what is really at issue is the social structuring, indeed the caste- 
structuring, of the economy itself (a point returned to at the end of the article, drawing on the 
analysis of Pierre Bourdieu). 
Arguably then, the working of caste in the modern market economy has not attracted the 
attention that caste in politics has (the exceptions are discussed below) because of the more 
general way in which the economic sphere is produced (through a dispersed set of discourses, 
practices and subjectivities (Slater 2002)). But the specific occlusion occurs because the public 
common-sense relegation of caste to politics (or religion) and alignment of ‘the modern’ to the 
market economy is itself an ideology of modern caste. 
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In a brilliant essay, ‘One Step Outside Modernity’ on caste and the public sphere, the   late 
 
M. S. S. Pandian drew attention to the sharply divided contemporary discourse on caste – an 
upper-caste silence on caste is counterpoised to the politics of difference in lower-caste 
struggles. He points to how the language of caste is delegitimized in the modern public domain, 
annexed as the religious/cultural ‘inner’ domain of the non-modern; and by extension how 
‘caste politics’ is the non-modern to the market economy, but goes on to say, the: 
 
 
Indian modern, despite its claim to be universal – and of course, because of it – not only constitutes 
lower castes as its ‘other’, but also inscribes itself silently as upper caste. Thus, caste, as the other of 
the modern, always belongs to the lower castes. (Pandian 2002, 1738) 
 
 
Regarding the inattention to caste in economy, what concerns me here, then, is the cultural 
logic within which markets and economics are located, bounded-off, deployed politically (or 
as a moral discourse) in the reproduction, refusal or renegotiation of caste (in nation and 
village); economics, that is, as a ‘category of practice’ (Curtis and Spencer 2012, 179). The 
challenge here of sustaining attention to caste in modernity especially in the market economy, 
in the universal discourses of planning, economics or human rights, focused on unequal 
relations (rather than religion and culture, or even politics) – a challenge inaugurated most 
obviously by Dalit leader Dr B. R. Ambedkar – is of course also refusal to align the experience 
of discrimination to the condition of underdevelopment, or to permit caste itself to be taken as 
‘a subaltern formation’ (Subramanian 2015, 296). Implicitly it is aligned to a claim against 
caste from the morality of the market; that it should be caste-free. 
The scholarly and political shift here was inaugurated by the activism of inferiorized caste 
groups such as ‘Dalits’ (the former untouchables) in the 1990s, coinciding with the 
liberalization of the Indian economy, and the struggles for dignity born of social experiences 
of  continuing  discrimination  and  humiliation  in  the  age  of  the  market   (Rawat        and 
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Satyanarayana 2016, 2–4). Dalit intellectuals posed a challenge to prevailing categories and 
distinctions. They refused to see colonialism as a unified discourse of power or as the decisive 
historical break (retrieving from the nationalist narrative a history of Dalit protests, partly 
enabled by colonial institutions and configurations of power, ibid 2016, 10), and they 
reinterpreted propositions about ‘caste’ being a cultural mode of oppression of the colonized 
by the colonizer as a means to allow ‘a postcolonial elite to masquerade as the oppressed rather 
than the oppressors’ (Dirks 2001, 312).4 Taking inspiration from the work of Bhimrao 
Ambedkar on the pervasiveness of caste effects, Dalit scholars rejected the submersion of caste 
into the analysis of class as much as into colonialism, and the postcolonial elite claim to 
modernity that invisibilized ascriptive caste in society and economy. 
Most important here, Dalit studies have fostered a body of research, 5 chiefly by economists, 
focused on the caste-regulated and caste-networked nature of the Indian market economy, 
discarding categorical separations of religion, politics or economy, while indicating the need 
for a new model of modern caste. 
Before turning to this evidence, I have two further perspectives on the public discourses that 
organize attention away from ‘caste economics’. The first concerns Indian social policy, and 
the way in which it has separated caste from the realm of the modern economy and (as 
mentioned) excluded caste from policy on development. The second, comes from village life, 
where my fieldwork finds a parallel separating out of caste as ritual rank eroded by market 
relations, on the one hand, and identity politics, on the other, in ways that hide the growing 
importance of caste in shaping new economic opportunity. 
 
 
 
4 These are the terms in which Dirks describes the Cambridge-school historians’ critique of post-Orientalist 
 
attention focused on the colonial and caste, as against capital and class. 
 
5 Including through the Indian Institute for Dalit Studies formed in 2003 http://dalitstudies.org.in 
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Caste in social policy: socio-religious disability and political empowerment 
 
 
 
Policy enclosure of caste in religion and culture 
 
 
 
In post-Independent India, there was a marked reluctance to use caste to explain poverty and 
inequality. As Christophe Jaffrelot points out, the ‘resolutely modernist attitude that 
permeated’ planning in Jawaharlal Nehru’s government combined a rejection of colonial caste- 
based classifications threatening the unity of the new nation, Marxist class universalism and 
Gandhian utopianism, and anticipated that ‘social and other distinctions will disappear’ with 
the development advance towards ‘the establishment of a society on the socialist pattern’, as 
Home Minister G. B. Pant put it in rejecting the use of caste in a 1953 commission on the 
‘Backward Classes’ (Jaffrelot 2006, 178–79). Caste was an archaic institution weakened by 
modern market forces that were as incompatible with caste’s continuity as Marx considered 
the colonial railways to be (Dumont 1980, 216). Moreover, as Uday Mehta (2010) argues, the 
constitutionally-defined domain of policy, politics and the state, supplanted the social order as 
a locus of authority, official power being legitimized in projects of national unity and the social 
upliftment of socially-unmarked individual citizens that gave no recognition to existing caste 
identity and relations.6 
The exception to the nationalist-secular exclusion of caste, concerned the former 
‘untouchables’ (today’s Dalits).  Indeed, caste entered modern public policy debate    through 
 
6 As Shruti Kapila (2015) points out, Ambedkar on the contrary ‘took the division and antagonism of the 
 
social, namely caste, as primary, and as one that required recognition within the realm of the political…’ 
warning against the dominant nationalist (Congress) ‘ignoring of the social question in its pure pursuit of the 
political.’ 
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provisions for those whose ‘backwardness’ was seen as arising from historical Hindu practices 
of ‘untouchability’ – a notion still without definition or test (Galanter 1984; Dirks 2001) – now 
compensated by provisions of the Constitution, and the protections afforded to them as 
Scheduled Castes, a category defined in religious terms so as to exclude Dalits of Muslim or 
Christian affiliation. 
In treating Dalits as essentially religious subjects, and enclaving caste as a matter of religion, 
separate from political economy, the Indian state inherited categorizations which (as well as an 
effect of the above-mentioned ‘market governance’) Rupa Viswanath in her recent book The 
Pariah Problem (2014b) finds as rooted in Protestant missionary engagement with Dalits in 
the late-nineteenth century. A chain of events and reactions led a Dalit condition of agrarian 
enslavement to be ‘spiritualized’ (rendering untouchability religious), and missionaries to be 
opposed as a threat to Hindu religion rather than as a challenge to landlord abuse of Dalit 
labour; and led M. K. Gandhi to insist on Hindu religious reform and penitence – change within 
– as the route to the emancipation of the untouchables, the British governing principle of 
religious non-interference having already closed-off caste practices from state intervention. 
When Dalits did eventually gain citizen rights to formerly-barred public spaces such as 
temples or water sources (by which time untouchability had been secularized as civic 
exclusion, through colonial ideas of public access (Rao 2009, 82, 130)), and when Dalit 
representatives in the twentieth-century system of devolved governance such as the Madras 
Legislative Council, raised objection to continued caste exclusion, Viswanath argues, the 
government treated this as a matter of ‘the social realm’ – something regarded as self-regulating 
and properly subject to gradual reform from within (of the kind Gandhi advocated) rather than 
as the infringement of socio-political rights, requiring legal/state intervention (as Ambedkar 
proposed) (Viswanath 2014b, 222 et seq.). 
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The point I take from this is that missionary and colonial policy, which disembedded ritual 
caste from political economy and separated ‘the social’ from the properly governmental 
(culture from economy, private from public), put in place the modern structure of categories 
that still works to remove caste from the realm of mainstream development policy. This was 
earlier seen in the way the colonial Labour Department and labour policy was separated from 
policy on the Depressed Classes (the Dalits) (Viswanath 2014a, 2014b, 224), and today in the 
way social policy construes caste (as it affects the condition of Dalits) not as a matter of 
political economy, but as a specific ‘social disability’. Caste is addressed as a (static) residual 
problem dealt with through remedial protections, safeguards and complaint-handling for 
marginal groups, so that they may, in the rubric, overcome their social and educational 
handicaps and ‘catch up with the rest of the population’ (NCSC 2016, 16)7. In state policy, 
caste is not a (dynamic) relational problem, critical to the on-going unequalizing 
socioeconomic processes within the ‘rest of the population’, as Ambedkar had insisted,8  even 
 
 
 
 
7 See http://socialjustice.nic.in/UserView/index?mid=1510; accessed 30 March 2018. The Ministry of Social 
 
Justice and Empowerment is the nodal Ministry overseeing the interests of the Scheduled Castes and the legal 
protections and schemes of assistance via the state Scheduled Castes Development Corporations (SCDCs) (Berg 
2014, 245). The National Commission for Scheduled Castes (separately constituted) advises on constitutional 
safeguards (on matters of untouchability, forced and child labour, and temple entry) and ‘special provisions’ 
(affirmative action). Its 2016 Handbook does not use the word ‘caste’ as a noun (aside from the named 
Scheduled Castes), except once in connection with untouchability (NCSC 2016, 87). 
8 Ambedkar (1947, 409–10) maintained that the economy was rooted in structures of caste, and warned of the 
 
separation of Fundamental Rights from economic rights, political freedoms from preconditioning economic 
freedoms, and political democracy from economic democracy (cf. insightful discussion in Rupa Viswanath’s 
2018 Ambedkar Lecture, 27 April 2018, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Edinburgh 
(https://routesblog.com/2018/04/28/fifth-annual-dr-b-r-ambedkar-lecture-at-the-university-of-edinburgh/) 
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though the key Ministry and Commission responsible derive their mandate from the Indian 
Constitution’s Fundamental Rights on equality. 9 
In other words, while socially disabled groups are subjects of policy and interventions, caste 
as a socioeconomic process is not. Everyday caste is a matter of culture and society not of 
government; it lies ‘behind the veil’ of law.10 Or, put another way, the conditions of Dalits are 
addressed as claims or demands on the government for services, education, or proportional 
development budgets (etc.), framed in terms of ‘special measures’ (affirmative action) rather 
than in terms of the state’s general duty to address caste as discrimination and structural 
inequality in economy and society (Waughray 2010, 336–37).11 While this ‘affirmative action’ 
seeks to alleviate disadvantage it does not aim to address its cause, that is prejudice in society’ 
(Castellino 2017, 238–39) and its political-economic underpinning (for which there is no legal 
redress through civil anti-discrimination or equality legislation).12 In policy terms, everyday 
relations  of  caste  are  a  matter  for  social  and  increasingly  now  neoliberal  market   self- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 On the distinction between residual and relational approaches see Mosse (2010). 
 
10 Annapurna Waughray, pers. comm. 
 
11 Take the example suggested by Rajan Kurai Krishnan: suppose Dalits are excluded from a water source 
 
installed by the state in the main village (the Tamil ūr); the conflict that arises is resolved by the provision of 
another water facility in the Dalit colony (the cēri). What is absent is any challenge to the power, labour control 
and denial of property which divides villages into the dominant ūr and the Dalit cēri in the first place (pers. 
comm.). 
12 India has no civil anti-discrimination or equality legislation, although this has recently been proposed in 
 
the form of an Anti-Discrimination and Equality Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha (the lower house) in March 
2017 by Congress MP Sashi Tharoor. 
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transformation.13 They only come into the view of the law when exceptionalized in the criminal 
juridical category of ‘caste atrocities’, that is specified wrongs with individual perpetrators 
(Rao 2009, 242). The special protections and Schedules, meanwhile, fix Dalit identity in 
relation to lineage and historical-religious injustice rather than present aspiration, while 
precluding transformation of that burdened identity, for example by religious conversion (to 
Islam or Christianity) which would sacrifice legal protections and welfare entitlements 
(Krishnan 2011). 
The significance of caste in unequal economic processes is thus lost in the ‘culturalization’ 
of caste (Natrajan 2011), and when construed as an issue of Indian religion and culture, caste 
is no matter for global policy and international agencies, whose concern with poverty or social 
exclusion is anyway overwritten in the ‘new development relationship’ with India, focused on 
trade and private-sector business. When talking with Indian or expatriate staff at the World 
Bank, UN or aid agencies in Delhi in 2011-12, I was indeed struck by the marked nervousness 
surrounding the issue of caste. Among bureaucrats and NGO workers, the degree of openness 
to the topic was often a reflection of the caste identity of my interlocutors. The underlying 
message is that caste is an internal matter, unique both in form and solution to India as a 
postcolonial nation; and the Indian government has ensured that it does not have monitored 
accountability to UN treaty bodies for its record on caste inequality or discrimination as a 
matter of human rights (see Mosse n.d.). 
If caste eludes mainstream development policy/planning, because, first, enclosed within 
religion, culture and ‘the social’, caste has more recently been enclosed within politics. This is 
the second policy framing I now turn to. 
 
 
 
13 Whereas under India’s international human rights law commitments they should also be matter of legal 
obligation (Annapurna Waughray, pers.comm.) 
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Policy enclosure of caste within politics 
 
 
 
The second (1980) Commission on the Socially Backward Classes (or Mandal Commission) 
introduced the hitherto politically and judicially rejected idea that caste could be used as a 
criterion of socio-economic backwardness (rather than socio-ritual disability), and extended 
quota reservations (e.g., for government jobs) to a diverse collection of so-called Other 
Backward Classes (the OBCs), some 3,743 caste identities comprising 52 per cent of the 
population. As the Mandal Report put it, ‘caste is also a class of citizen...’ (cited in Jaffrelot 
2006, 183) and socio-economic backwardness a caste-collective (or categorical) effect (Jayal 
2015, 122). But, as Jaffrelot argues, the rationale behind the eventual implementation of 
Mandal’s recommendations was not so much to view caste in relation to economic processes 
and improve the position of caste-disadvantaged groups, as to empower them politically (2006, 
183). ‘We believe,’ said Prime Minister V.P. Singh announcing the schemes in 1990, ‘that no 
section can be uplifted merely by money. They can develop only if they have a share in power 
[…and in the] running of the country’ (in Jaffrelot 2006, 183). 
The upper-caste violent protest against extending reservations that ensued certainly brought 
political substance to what began as an abstract administrative category – the OBCs – and later 
electoral success to their caste-based parties; a political rise of ‘lower’14 castes that Jaffrelot 
calls the ‘silent revolution’. This brought a ‘new legitimacy to caste in the public sphere’ (2006, 
185), belatedly fulfilling Ambedkar’s    intention that caste, which had  been perpetuated as a 
 
 
 
14 There are no easy alternatives to the contentious and simplifying terms ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ caste used in 
 
cited articles which, it should be stressed, refer not to any accepted stratification, but to a history of power, 
domination and unequal social recognition encoded in vernacular as well as sociological languages. 
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hidden violence in the concealed domain of the social, should (through provisions of 
affirmative action) be brought into the open and translated into the public realm of agonistic 
politics (Kapila, in press). 
The story of how Mandal produced a new political category and changed that category’s 
relationship to power is well known. But what is less observed is the relative autonomy of this 
transformation of caste in the realm of politics from caste in the economy (despite Ambedkar’s 
warnings of the dangers of political democracy in the absence of economic democracy). 
Witsoe’s (2013) book Democracy against Development shows for Chief Minister Lalu Prasad 
Yadav’s Bihar state between 1999 and 2005, how OBCs were able to take control of political 
power, and for a period disrupt the upper-caste controlled project of state-directed 
development, but could not institutionalize this power so as to bring equalizing economic gains 
(cf. Jaffrelot 2006, 187). As Kapila (forthcoming) argues, the pre-eminence of politics as the 
mechanism for dealing with social matters, and the displacement of social and economic 
relations of caste onto the issue of reservations, instilled a gap between the political and the 
economic through which caste inequality is reproduced. 
There is an argument by Niraja Jayal (2015) among others that the extension of public sector 
reservations to lower castes, and the restriction of the caste issue to this, was a strategic effort 
to keep caste out of economics; that is a form of ‘caste abatement,’ offering political 
recognition to disadvantaged groups while avoiding economic redistribution, and serving to 
contain the political discontent surrounding unequal economic opportunity unleased by the 
simultaneous (but more stealthy) introduction of neoliberal reforms– effectively protecting 
elite class-caste interests now re-oriented to private business. 
How caste is kept in politics and out of economics (notwithstanding the political need to 
hold an aspiring urban ‘neo-middle-class’ of OBC background [Jaffrelot 2015]) is also 
explained  in  studies  of  the  upper-caste/middle-class  politics  of  caste  refusal  revealed in 
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ethnographic sites such as Subramanian’s (2015) elite Indian Institutes of Technology, in 
which ‘reservations’ provide the ground for denigrating unmodern and moribund caste, and the 
self-serving political entrepreneurs who, as its low-caste purveyors, give caste its unneeded 
afterlife (see also S. Deshpande 2013; Fuller and Narasimhan 2014; Jodhka and Manor 2018). 
The cultivation of ‘castelessness’ (invisibilizing upper-caste identities), which Deshpande 
(2013) argues is an assertion of caste power (see below) particularly encoded in the ‘casteless’ 
market economy, Vithayathil (2018) sees manifest in the executive bureaucracy’s push-back 
against the effort to reintroduce caste enumeration into the national census in 2011; an effort 
which was itself a policy response to lower-caste political pressure challenging ‘the invisible 
privileges of upper castes’ (2018, 477). 
There are reasons to see the current administration under Narendra Modi’s leadership with 
its strong neo-liberal, pro-business, growth-oriented, disparity-concealing (especially of 
disadvantaged Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims) character, as keeping the economics of caste 
firmly out of policy view (see e.g., Tharamangalam 2016; Jaffrelot 2015). There has been cut- 
back of the various remedial protections, budget allocations and programmes earlier extended 
to Scheduled Castes under the rubric of ‘inclusive growth’ in the Five-Year Plans of the 
national Planning Commission, which is now replaced by Modi’s more technocratic ‘NITI 
Aayog’15 policy think-tank for his goal of market-driven ‘rapid transformation’ focussing on 
matters such as ‘developing infrastructure for the industrial corridors and markets’ (Engineer 
2015). And this managerialist governance is seen as enforced by a combination of authoritarian 
restrictions on civil society activism (labelled ‘anti-national’), and tolerance for identity- 
building Hindu nationalist anti-Dalit (and Muslim) violence. But the policy turn with Modi 
might be seen not so much as separating the economy from the politics of caste as building 
 
 
15 National Institution for Transforming India. 
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politics on neoliberal economics – growth for all, citizenship as market participation, political 
democracy as economic freedom (Birla 2015, 467) – appealing to individual market actors and 
‘seeking transcendence of the social’ so as to leave out caste (Kapila 2015). And with a ‘closing 
[of] the gap between the economic and the political, the work of difference and identity is 
increasingly becoming the work of culture....’(ibid). What this means is that within an 
individualizing market ethics, the cohering interests and obligations of the group or the 
community are construed in cultural terms as the distinctive ‘ethnic’ flavour of Brand India’s 
capitalist enterprise, its dharmic or ‘karma capitalism’ (Birla 2010, 83-4), not as the relational 
dynamics of caste within the economy – unequalizing and discriminatory. 
Modi’s ‘conservative revolution’ (Kapila 2015) thus combines a language of market 
transformation with a politics of preserving caste advantage, ensuring caste is protected as 
private cultural fabric. Alongside the denial of caste, Balmurli Natrajan (2012) and others point 
to the narration that what remains of caste is benign or beneficial: caste is celebrated 
community or cultural identity and diversity, part of the vitality of Indian democracy; caste is 
the culture of business trust. Natrajan (2018) aptly regards this stripping caste of its relationality 
and ‘camouflaging as “culture”’ as an instance of Bourdieu’s symbolic power, that is power 
over a system of classification. Recoding caste as culture legitimizes and protects inherited 
status since claims regarding discrimination cannot be made against the preservation of cultural 
practices (for example, vegetarianism effectively caste-marking/segregating public, social or 
residential spaces).16 Caste here is a private and domestic matter; a domain of culture not to be 
‘contaminated with selfish, anti-national, “terrorist” caste politics’ (as a Dalit friend summed- 
 
16 Natrajan (2018) further suggests that when Dalit activists assert distinctive cultural rights (beef-eating and 
 
resisting its ban by the Indian government is his case) rather than mobilization against caste as a sociopolitical 
issue of injustice and oppression, they risk inadvertently playing into this caste-perpetuating ethics of managed 
cultural diversity. 
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up the experience of the middleclass conversational exclusion of caste). The caste-based 
violence that reaches TV screens and newspapers represents an ‘abnormality’ of normally 
benign caste (Natrajan 2012). 
In sum, whether premised on compensation for religious and civic disability, or on political 
empowerment through reservations, or the rejection of reservations in the name of merit, 
modernity and market-led development, or on a new conservatism in which caste politics is 
buried in market economics and ‘subcontracted to cultural life’ (Kapila 2015), public policy 
discourse directs attention away from the vitality and social effects of caste in the post-reform 
Indian economy. The past decade has seen a growing Dalit activist challenge to this policy 
exclusion of relational caste, re-invoking caste, and placing caste on the development agenda 
in the rubric of ‘Dalit rights’ in national and international fora in ways that are discussed 
elsewhere (Mosse 2017). 
 
 
Caste in the village: receding rank and rising politics 
 
 
 
As a prelude to the study of ‘Caste out of Development’, I visited the Tamil village in 
Ramanathapuram District (which I call Alapuram) in which three decades earlier I first tried to 
make sense of caste. I cannot possibly explain the complex transformations of caste, as I have 
tried to in my book The Saint in the Banyan Tree (Mosse 2012), but what struck me here was 
a parallel narrative of archaic caste erased by market relations, and caste rising as identity 
politics, that rendered undetectable the structural effects of caste on new economic opportunity. 
While it has never been possible, for this village, to describe the varied identities and social 
relations as anything like a ‘caste system’, the idea of an archaic caste order has always been 
present as a kind of public representation. Referenced through its symbols, spaces, rituals and 
exchanges,  this  ceremonial  order was  a way of encoding  or  loading  labour  and  artisanal 
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services (of barbers, potters, water-turners, dhobis and of course Dalit labourers) as well as the 
priesthood, ritual and temple worship with caste identity and hence obligation and social status; 
such as when a landlord invokes symbols of honour/subordination from a long-gone royal 
order, and pays artisans or Dalit workers with certain grains and gifts coding rights/duties that 
are caste-linked, hereditary and non-negotiable. Exchanges were far too integrated into markets 
of all kinds for this to mark a kind of non-market, non-monetary or jajmāni-type relations (let 
alone a ‘system’).17 But such caste coding could extend to various economic transactions such 
as Dalit tenants’ share-cropping (paṅku) arrangements. This caste-rank coding also provided 
the symbolic language for challenges to established collective caste power, such as when Dalits 
grab the festival statues, or change the festival or funeral procession routes, or enter the village 
temples and teashops (Mines 2005; Mosse 2012), part of a subordinated group’s unfolding 
drama of change made apparent to them by their own ritual-political acts (Hastrup 2006, 156). 
These ‘bound-mode’ relationships, as David (1977) working in Jaffna glosses the Tamil 
kaṭṭupāṭu totarpu (part of what he terms the ‘aristocratic schema’) find their counterpart in the 
‘nonbound-mode’ (iṣtamāna totarpu) indicated by voluntary contacts, negotiated rates, cash 
payment, choice, mutual satisfaction (cantōṣam), tradeable skill or art (for artisans of 
drummers);  in short, what we  might  now  characterize as  relations  of ‘the  market’ (or     a 
 
17 Fuller (1989) points to the anthropological confusion in studies of jajmani between a ‘village 
 
establishment’ of hereditary caste village officers and servants (the baluta system of the Maharashtrian region, 
but equally of south Indian kingdoms) and patron-client (jajmani) relations. But in Alapuram, this was not so 
much a confusion as a social fact. In the nineteenth century, successful cultivators (of Utaiyar caste) benefitting 
from secure property rights and regional markets for cotton and groundnut cash crops advanced by the British, 
upturned the old village establishment by privatizing control of land and common property, but then ensured 
that new dyadic landlord-labourer/artisan relations took on the form and idiom of an (older) public hierarchy of 
village service, thereby turning economic power to caste status within an established order (Mosse 2012, 108– 
12, 302, 2003, 205–6). 
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‘mercantile schema’ 1977). Not a stable code-of-conduct, this is a ‘frame [that] emerges with 
the act’ (Hastrup 2006, 155), an implicit reference for artisans and Dalits who in the early- 
1980s attempted to change the social meaning of work, replacing caste-referencing grain 
transactions with the market-idiom of cash payments that rewarded individual skill not inherent 
(caste) attributes (Good 1982). The liberating idea (rather than actual practice) of transactions 
freed from caste ‘entanglements’ and closed-off from a nexus of obligations was captured in 
the Alapuram Dalit dhobi’s comment to me in 1983 that ‘services paid for in cash have no 
pollution (tiṭṭu)’. 
In the early-1980s, among artisans, participation in caste-referencing transactions 
symbolised inclusion in what was represented as the village community or ūr, while other, 
‘market’, transactions (albeit practically pervasive) were exceptional to this order (cf. Miller 
2002). So when in 1983, Rayappar a village carpenter (caste/occupation) explained to me the 
grain-share entitlements (known as cutantaram) he received as his family’s hereditary right 
(urimai) from Utaiyar caste and other farmers (calculated in terms of the pairs of ploughing 
bullocks of the patron’s household) for work on their ploughs and farm implements, his ritual 
role at house-building ceremonies, and his maintenance of the temple festival chariots (see 
Mosse 2012, 112, 140), he contrasted this with ‘private’ work (using the English word) paid 
for separately in cash (tāṉikkācu, ‘independent money’). Apart from odd-jobs on tables or 
chairs (etc.), such work falling beyond the purview of caste-defined cutantaram was that done 
for outsiders to the village or for Dalits within it (the few owing draft cattle).18 
By 2009, what had been residual in common representations of the work of village carpenters 
 
– the  separately  paid  ‘private’  work  –  now  seemed  to  define  it,  exceptionalizing caste- 
 
 
 
 
18 Since alongside annual grain as a kind of tithe or retainer, patron farmers also paid cash for the carpenter 
caste tasks, the relevant distinction is between caste-linked/unlinked rather than payments in kind or cash. 
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referencing work. When I enquired from carpenter Michael Acari about cutantaram grain for 
repairing farmers’ ploughs, he quickly replied, ‘[I’m] not going for slave work (aṭimai vēlai) 
nowadays; if [we] work, [we] get wages (kūli).’ He explained how no longer was he at anyone’s 
beck and call, readying ploughs in the early hours. ‘For kindness (aṉpukku) we will fall at the 
feet, but [we] will not submit to power (atikāram),’ he said, adding, ‘We’ve become social 
(cōcalāyirucci)’ (Mosse 2012, 249). Even when describing his on-going work on processional 
chariots and door-frame ceremonies (nilai vaikkiṟatu), he emphasized payment for his skill and 
knowledge (or possession of an almanac), explicitly disconnected from caste. A changed 
ethical judgement had refigured the relationship between vēlai (work or current employment) 
and tolil (caste-specific occupation), the act and the actor (see Good 1982). And a market idiom 
that was earlier an exception, or for Dalits an aspirational counter to relationships of caste or 
kaṭṭupāṭu (order, discipline), by 2009 pervasively over-wrote caste-connected work. I was 
myself rebuked for using phrases signalling old-order practices that were entirely ordinary 25 
years earlier. ‘We have become social’ (cōcalāyirucci) was a common expression, referencing 
a permissive freedom or market disentanglement from social roles and conventions popularised 
in films (Mosse 2012, 250). 
This moral claim is repeated as Paraiyar (Dalit) drummers negotiate a transactional re- 
description of themselves as fee-charging professional performers and artists; and the services 
of barbers, dhobis, potters and others are relocated from the person-centred exchanges at homes 
to the impersonal ones of the laundry, shop, stall and salon in Alapuram’s expanding 
commercial centre— ‘an “outside” space where unknowing and unknown outsiders mingle and 
are served’ (2012, 251). In parallel, land tenure dominated by ‘bound-mode’ share-cropping 
covering 64 per cent of tenanted land in 1982-3, had reduced by a third in 1994-5, with a still- 
continuing shift to more market-contractual fixed-rate and land-mortgage tenancy (Mosse 
2003, 206). 
25  
This expansion of the market as a moral (and physical) space is not in itself recent, but while 
over most of the 150-year village history I have studied, market-based claims have been folded 
back into public representations of collective caste order (or their resistance), by the turn of the 
millennium, regardless of actual work and dependencies, the common narrative was of a shift 
towards independence, contract and individual choice. What has changed is the ideology or 
framing of economic life not necessarily its practice (Miller 2002). Today, the old order of 
caste is firmly placed in the uncouth/enslaved (aciṅkam /aṭimai) past by a narrative of the 
growth of civility (nākarīkam), alongside market freedoms. This was confirmed in a survey 
and interviews in 200919 that revealed a weakening of the discourse of caste honour and group 
status mobility, or the perceived irrelevance of activist narratives of struggle against upper- 
caste domination. It could be said, following Bate (2009, 79–80), that the ‘public’ space had 
become socially unenclosed (or puṟam, ‘outer’), having been denuded of its ‘interior’ (akam) 
moral-social-caste character. Certainly, the language of caste distinction is rarely heard in 
public, partly owing to it being subject to criminal cases, although a persisting ‘inner’ caste 
state of caste mind is often suspected amidst the rank-repudiating public forms of respect. 
Research across regions records a democratization of former markers of social recognition, 
whether food, dress, grooming or styles of worship, and a ‘declining ability of others to impose 
social inequalities’, as Kapur et al. (2010, 48) conclude from a large-scale study of Dalits in 
Uttar Pradesh across two sub-districts. But we should be more cautious than these authors are 
in reading a grassroots narrative of modernization and changed public codes of behaviour as 
signs of market-driven social transformation. For one thing, as just noted, we should not 
mistake a change in ideological framing for a change in practice. For another, the invocations 
 
19 A survey of 234 individuals (of different ages, gender, class and caste – mostly Dalit) was conducted by 
 
my research assistant M. Sivan, alongside in-depth interviews by Dr Selvaraj Arulnathan (see Mosse 2018b, 
276–83). 
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of the market are themselves claims that are deeply embedded in caste contentions (cf. Keane 
2008). When working a shift from obligated funeral servants to musicians hired at negotiated 
rates, Paraiyar drummers in Alapuram were not presenting themselves as economic agents with 
a now-equalized caste-cultural identity, but using the ethics of contract and market exchange 
to make claims in a relational field of caste power and honour/dishonour.20 
Third, Dalits in Alapuram would tend to see a caste order not undermined by the market (or 
gone with ‘time’s change’ – kālam mārirucci – as upper castes often did), but defeated by their 
political struggle against untouchability in the 1960s and 70s, armed as they were with 
education and new economic independence. Then again, achieved equality also produces 
inequality. The collective action of a Pallar caste Dalit elite may have made it utterly irrelevant 
who carries the statues, enters the teashops, bicycles in the main street; but class inequality 
widens and a categorical separation of the poorer Paraiyar caste remains, indicative of the 
persisting division and disparity among Dalits. Moreover, Dalit men not infrequently escaped 
dishonour by displacing ignominious tasks such as providing free labour and accepting 
handouts at life-crisis rituals needed to retain upper-caste patrons onto their womenfolk. 
Moreover, with the disappearance of overt practises of caste rank, attention is drawn to subtle 
attitudinal, communicative, performative and experiential aspects of caste prejudice and 
humiliation, the strategies or tactics produced through interactions (as practical logic rather 
than social rule) and shaped by the enduring socially-deposited attitudes, dispositions, or 
‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1977b) of caste, captured in the Tamil concept of cātiputi, loosely  ‘caste 
 
20 Unlike urban Dalit activists, none I knew in Alapuram’s Paraiyar street expressed interest in reviving parai 
 
drumming as a symbol of a distinct Dalit culture, that is ‘honouring the stigma’ through performances in Dalit 
arts festivals. Indeed, these village Dalit musicians preferred to play the standard temple drum and wind 
instruments (mēḷam and nākacuvaram) as they guarded against the continuing threat of dishonour and servility 
(Mosse 2012, 183, cf. Natrajan 2018). 
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mind’, ‘mentality’ or ‘disposition’, explored in its variety of new codes and technologies – 
attire, objects, gestures, sounds and other semiotic forms (verbal and non-verbal) and 
behaviours (cāti palakkam, caste practice/habit), and interpretations of behaviour, by   Murali 
Shanmugavelan (2018). 
 
Even if not having the significance it is often given, the ranked caste order has nonetheless 
faded from Alapuram village public life. But paradoxically, at the same time caste is more 
visible than ever. As you climb down from a bus at the roadside commercial centre of the 
village you will be confronted by clusters of flags, banners and posters signalling a proliferation 
of caste associations, fronts, movements, parties and NGOs. Competition to occupy public 
space brings ever-larger wedding or puberty ceremony banners; and statues of caste heroes 
(ancient and modern) erected in village squares signal group identity and connections. 
But, despite appearances, caste is not reborn within the village in the communalized, form 
that characterizes district or state-level politics – with its rallies, guru pujas, violent street 
clashes and lethal police firing. A disjuncture between communal caste politics and the 
quotidian village is maintained by skilled political entrepreneurs who inter-translate between 
the two. Thus, Dalit party or movement leaders secure a base of support along caste lines 
through building reputations for the mediation of disputes – over land, water or inheritance, 
mostly not having a caste basis – rather than through contentious caste politics, which 
dissipates in the village (see Mosse 2012, 259–60). Indeed, as Krishna (2018a) finds from 
large-scale cross-state surveys, people turn to caste-crossing political entrepreneurs or fixers 
(naya netas) – a disproportionate number of whom are nowadays Dalits – to bridge the gap in 
accessing the state (for bank loans, insurance claims or school places). Public expressions of 
caste are not so much absent as deferred onto politics. Thus, working in the opposite direction 
to the politicians, Dalit youth activists work to translate diverse issues into the language of 
caste contention so as to mobilize external support (from police or politicians), such as  when 
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in cases of individual (not caste-based) disputes over irrigation water, appeals for intervention 
from the state were made in the arresting language of the threat of caste conflict (cāti 
piraccanai) (Mosse 2003, 213–14). 
Simplifying a point, one could say, first, that in the village as in the nation, caste recedes as 
archaic system of group rank and honour, with market relations providing the idiom for 
transactions unbound to caste; and, second, that ‘caste politics’ now has an autonomy from 
everyday economic life in the village (that was not the case in the caste struggles of the 1960s 
and 70s). But why did a majority (82 per cent) of Dalits questioned in an Alapuram village 
survey say that caste was a barrier or obstacle (tatai) to their family advancement, meaning 
economic welfare? How does caste shape opportunity? 
 
 
Part II: Caste and market economy 
 
 
 
Caste and opportunity in the village economy 
 
 
 
It is at this point that I need to turn to caste and economy beginning with the village economy. 
When Dalit businessman and intellectual Chandra Bhan Prasad says that ‘capitalism can 
destroy the caste system from the inside’ (Prasad 2008, 2), he invokes the impact of the post- 
1990 decline of Indian agriculture, and the explosion of non-farm opportunities on caste as an 
agrarian order. In Alapuram, the abandonment of cultivable land to woodfuel shrubs, farmers’ 
reliance on crop insurance pay-outs, public distribution rice, or employment scheme wages as 
much as tilling the land, and the huge diversification of non-farm business within the village, 
and work outside, all signal what is a national trend. 
This has been tracked in longitudinal village studies, none more thorough than the seven- 
decade Palanpur project in Uttar Pradesh. Its recent reports (Himanshu et al. 2013) show  that 
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an overall decline in poverty is, nonetheless, accompanied by an increase in inequality as the 
poorest depend upon uncertain casual work in railways, cloth mills, bakeries, bottling liquor or 
brick kilns, or migrating as construction workers. The impact of such change on caste relations 
is a complex issue. It is true that the Palanpur researchers find most inequality between 
households, thus within caste, implying that caste is unimportant to (or made so by) such 
change. But other studies show the transition out of farming to industry reinforcing caste-based 
debt and dependency. Ethnographic studies of the diversifying economy of villages show 
complex and intersecting caste, class and gender effects. As examples, near the Tiruppur textile 
hub in Tamil Nadu, Carswell and de Neve (2014) find quite opposite effects – both eroding 
and entrenching caste inequality – even in close-by and apparently similar villages. In the 
village hinterland of Chennai, Anandhi, (2017, 106–8) finds access to casual industrial work 
freeing Dalit youth from caste-coded (kaṭṭupāṭu) labour dependence. However, peri-urban 
precarity also deepens gender inequality. Young Adidravidar/Paraiyar (Dalit) men in irregular 
work in Chennai prefer periods of unemployment to degrading agricultural labour; but their 
irregular factory work is insufficient to meet household needs that are elevated by the 
consumption expectations, education fees and dowry payments born of new status ambitions. 
Meanwhile, investment in a new Dalit modernity and masculinity involves ‘upper’-caste-class 
gender notions regarding status, honour (mānam) and respectability (mariyātai) that bear down 
on Dalit women who carry an extra burden of income earning (agricultural labouring, cattle 
rearing) and domestic work, while being subject to patriarchal controls. There appears then an 
inverse relationship between developing caste social status and women’s status (2017, 109), as 
well as new assertions over both the older generation, and the inferiorized Arunthathiyar caste 
(in the village studied) who remain locked in dependency relations with dominant caste 
landowners. 
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The factors accounting for the different impact of labour and other markets on caste, and 
caste on rural markets are varied – histories of land control or reform, urban proximity, caste 
demography and political mobilization among them – and do not permit generalization about 
the erasure of caste effects in the post-liberalization rural economy (e.g., Himanshu et al. 2013; 
Lanjouw and Rao 2011). Observing caste effects in the economic life of today’s villages is not 
easy. What struck me as my assistant and village resident M. Sivan revisited 60 Alapuram 
families of different castes to ask about the route to work and qualifications of their sons and 
daughters, was that despite being a receding determinant of standing in the village, caste was 
important in structuring opportunity in the world beyond. Caste was an alloyed effect, bound 
up and disguised in the mobilization of capital, dowry payments, or networks into institutions 
(of government, the Church etc.). Caste was embedded in relations of kin, friendship, with 
class-mates, priests, or agents mediating work abroad, and of course marriage through which 
entry into higher education, urban employment or business was navigated, and which 
reproduced the historical privileges of caste such as inherited wealth (land) and productive 
networks. 
A deepening urban-rural opportunity divide (see Krishna 2018b, 2017) amplified this 
significance of caste. In Alapuram (as elsewhere) upper-caste families (e.g., Vellalars, 
Chettiyars) were the first to exploit connections for more lucrative futures in regional towns 
and cities, eventually selling up and relocating out of the village in the 1970s and 1980s, while 
Dalits sought economic mobility by investing in farming livelihoods. But the later reduction in 
low-skilled jobs (with factory closures or mechanization) and raised prequalifications for urban 
formal sector employment (in terms of skills, cultural capital, and connections) (Krishna 
2018b, 2017) gave caste renewed importance to those seeking exit from the limited 
opportunities of the village. 
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Caste was now mobilized not as public status but as a network resource; not for the 
preservation or enhancement of the status of the group (as in earlier conflicts that canalized 
economic opportunity into the idiom of ritual rank (cf. Bailey 1957, 270), but in support of 
individual mobility (redirecting symbolic capital to economic opportunity). The banners and 
posters, the marriage halls, scholarships and prizes for ‘topper’ students of regionally-linked 
subscription-collecting caste associations were not organizing for village or regional political 
power so much as networking for access to the regional economy. (Of course, the two 
interlink). To borrow Kirsten Hastrup’s distinction, here caste is less ‘substance’ – that is 
ethnicized collective identity in struggles for political power – and more ‘set’ – that is looser, 
intentional, strategic network, pragmatically realised in the search for jobs, skills, marriages 
and support in local dispute mediation (2006, 156–57). 
It is poverty in this resource of caste (capital and connections) that leaves a proportion of 
Dalits in economic insecurity. Indeed, while their fathers organised against caste-exclusion 
from public places like teashops or temples, and to carry the festival statues of the saints, in a 
field of caste honour, Alapuram Dalit youth mobilized around the privileges, chits and tickets 
for access to the economy, targeting the gatekeepers of opportunity such as schools, colleges 
or the Church. 
My final point from the village is that this shift from honour to opportunity – from action 
around group status to group action for individual mobility – decreases the visibility of caste- 
effects. Caste reworked as private connections and capital is not easily perceived as such. 
Among the Alapuram Dalits surveyed in 2009, the expectation of equal treatment (e.g., in 
schools and colleges) was firm, and in accounting for outcomes (jobs etc.), they emphasised 
personal talent, qualifications, skill, good luck and God’s blessing, alongside helpful priests 
and patrons, even though it is well understood that the route to the good bishop is by way of 
his caste-networked secretary (2018b, 279). Despite their own insistence that these are days of 
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civility and equality, the majority of Dalits surveyed nonetheless expected ill-treatment and 
disrespect as they sought work or other breaks, and could not imagine escape into the casteless 
anonymity they desired; or into ‘mere poverty’ (Roberts 2016, 55). In fact, poverty itself 
exposes people to caste humiliation, and our survey showed that the poorest and women were 
most incentivized by ill-treatment to try to conceal their caste when labouring in distant places. 
 
 
Caste difference and exclusion in the wider market economy21 
 
 
What I am suggesting is that in the nation and in the village there appears to be a disjuncture 
between the public narrative of caste (as market-eroded tradition and identity politics) and the 
processes of caste which are firmly part of the modern market economy. But there remains 
uncertainty about the nature of these processes, their harder-to-detect effects and how they are 
to be discovered. 
Ethnographers already knew that those who controlled the village land gained advantages in 
the regional and industrial economy, and that caste networks in cooperatives, sand-mining 
cartels, in companies and the Church are critical to the functioning of business, bureaucracy 
and education (Shah et al. 2018; Witsoe 2018; Jodhka and Manor 2018). And that those drawn 
or pushed out of agriculture are sorted into work graded by skill, security, danger or toxicity in 
caste-related ways, the gender divide allocating the worst work to Dalit women, who carry the 
greatest burden of social degradation (e.g., Carswell, de Neve, and Heyer 2018 on the Tiruppur 
garment industry). 
 
 
 
 
 
21 These sections on caste in the economy, in the labour market and in business adapt and summarise a more 
detailed review of literature elsewhere (Mosse 2018a). 
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But identifying caste effects in the wider economy that are visible only in the aggregate and 
which are not easily (or at all) traceable to the agency of caste collectives, or action within a 
framework of caste, requires different instruments – in particular, the large-sample surveys22 
and statistical methods of economists, who have perhaps done more than anthropologists to 
identify the modern ‘Grammar of Caste’– to use economist Ashwini Deshpande’s (2017) title 
– even though the caste-merging block-categories of analysis of national datasets – SC, ST, 
OBC and General – are sociologically crude and sometimes misleading. 
At the scale of national data sets it becomes clear that post-reform development and its 
economic diversification has not, as regards employment, broken the association of ‘upper’ 
castes with higher-status professions and Dalits with manual and casual labour. The data reveal 
glass walls against Dalit occupational mobility out of caste-typed roles or low-end service 
trades into more profitable ones, or self-employment (M. Das 2013); and a widening caste 
disparity in earnings at the top of the income distribution, and in access to the most prestigious 
jobs, in the post-reform period indicate a ‘glass ceiling’ effect (A. Deshpande 2017, xv). 
Meanwhile, the intersections of caste and gender mean that Dalit women, with comparatively 
higher (although declining) participation rates in the labour force, are particularly restricted in 
job mobility (A. Deshpande 2017; M. Das 2013). In parallel, the rapid expansion of private 
business with a two-thirds increase in enterprises since 1990, and half the workforce self- 
employed by 2005 (Harriss-White, Vidyarthee and Dixit 2014, 40, 51), has not brought 
freedom from caste effects. The Dalit share of enterprise ownership is disproportionately small, 
and initially decreased post-reforms before rising by 2005 (Iyer, Khanna, and Varshney 2013, 
56). Data reveal the business economy as a caste-structured field, and Dalits (often as first- 
 
 
 
22 Data sets include those of the Indian decennial censuses, and surveys such as the National Family Health 
Survey, the National Sample Surveys of India, and the District Level Household Survey of India. 
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generation entrants) are firmly at the bottom, running rural petty shops, as dealers or agents 
(Harriss-White and Vidyarthee 2010). To the ‘glass-ceiling’ effect in salaried employment is 
added the ‘sticky-floor’ effect of a widening caste-gap in earnings at the lower end of income 
from self-employment (Deshpande 2017, xxiv). 
The social processes underlying these patterns are still under-studied, but let me highlight 
three kinds of caste effect: first, the differential valuation (ranking) of occupations and 
derivatively markets; second, the effect of categorical distinctions, caste identity and caste 
networks; and third, the combining of these as discrimination. These processes are not distinct, 
but are interdependent and build on each other. 
 
 
Occupational ranking 
 
 
 
Evidence for the persisting differential valuation of work, workers, businesses and markets is 
strong; a fact overlooked by The World Bank when its 2011 report on Poverty and Social 
Exclusion in India (2011, 118) concluded with Prasad’s optimistic words: 
 
 
Along with a new tool which neutralizes caste, the sweeper [in the shopping mall] turns into a 
housekeeper, looking more like a paramedic than a traditional sweeper. In one stroke, the market has 
liberated the broom from its caste identity, and the occupation has become caste-neutral. (2008, 29) 
 
 
The caste-typing of jobs such as Dalit labour in sanitary work or for that matter Brahman 
cooks and suppliers in the south Indian restaurant trade (Iversen and Raghavendra 2006) are 
only the most obvious examples of a more pervasive caste effect in occupation. Identity-bound 
work particularly characterizes the most stigmatized occupations. The placing of the social cost 
of disposal of noxious waste onto undervalued humans is found in Barbara Harriss-White’s 
study of the informal waste economy of a Tamil town (2017, 110), and is something well- 
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known from the unprotected work of dealing with human excreta known as ‘manual 
scavenging’, prohibited by law but still assigned to the lowest Dalit castes (Singh 2014). The 
underlying attitudes to purity, pollution and the valuation of shit-related tasks as degrading and 
associated with untouchable caste status, accounts for the failure of rural pit latrines (requiring 
manual emptying – a task only for Dalits) and persistence of globally-high rates of health- 
damaging open defecation in India (Coffey et al. 2017; Coffey and Spears 2017). Such caste- 
typing of waste work is carried over into new sanitation and sewer programmes (Tam 2013) 
and within the waste recycling businesses studied by Gill (2012) in Delhi; the more inferiorized 
the market (e.g., for unsegregated part-organic waste as against segregated plastics) the more 
linked to caste-occupational pasts. An enclaving of Dalit business in such low-status or 
shunned markets is also an effect of their exclusion from other sectors. Across the economy, 
an occupational ranking of markets differentiates Dalit access. While sectors such as 
mining/quarrying, construction and transport are relatively open to Dalit businesses, health and 
education, food, hospitality and the service sectors are found to be relatively closed to them 
(Harriss-White, Vidyarthee, and Dixit 2014, 67; Thorat, Kundu, and Sadana 2010, 320–21). 
 
 
Categories and connections: caste identity and networks 
 
 
 
The caste segmentation of labour markets and business indicates a cultural logic embedded 
within and perpetuated through economic activity. It is demonstration of the fact that in 
economic transactions people are treated differently according to their social identity, an idea 
central to the field of ‘identity economics’ (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). More specifically, 
Charles Tilly (1998, 2010) argues that transactions involving greater and lesser beneficiaries 
generate categorical boundaries which gain efficiency by coinciding with unequal categories 
of wider society (e.g., of gender or caste). Systems of labour recruitment operating on   social 
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categories (independent of individual characteristics) then restrict mobility to more skilled and 
better-paid work. I have noted such categorical effects in research on the construction sites of 
western India which distinguish Saurashtrian bricklayers from Dalit/Bhil casual labourers, 
ensuring that even after 25 years’ work on construction sites, in stone quarries, lime kilns and 
brick fields, a Dalit (or Adivasi) labourer has no chance to get skilled or better-paid work 
(despite a shortage of skilled labour) (Mosse 2010, 1126). Tilly’s (1998) counterpart 
‘opportunity hoarding’ is found at the upper-end of employment where, for example, Upadhaya 
(2007) argues the IT industry consolidates occupational privilege by recruiting from middle- 
class/upper-castes and providing new and well-paid employment opportunities. 
The occupational differentiation produced by such ‘categorical exclusion’ and ‘opportunity 
hoarding’ becomes self-reproducing by influencing skill acquisition (Tilly 2001, 1998; Munshi 
2016a, 27). The manner in which caste identity works here as an imposed societal 
categorization, also has effects through constituting subjectivities and self-worth, evidenced, 
for example, when Dalits (in a national sample) are found to perceive lower levels of earning 
as remunerative (Goel and Deshpande 2016). However, we also know from Hoff and Pandey’s 
(2006) widely cited experimental studies how such caste identity is not a fixed attribute; what 
is important is the contextual making-salient of caste. In their research, for example, when (and 
only when) caste identities were publicly announced before a problem-solving experimental 
task was the performance of Dalit students negatively affected in comparison to non-Dalits (the 
so-called ‘stereotype threat effect’). That is to say, caste identity is not substantial and stable 
but frame- or context-dependent in its effects. 
This requires attention to how contexts make caste salient, how caste is cued. In business, 
for example, caste may be cued to seek competitive advantage. Thus, a Dalit woman supplying 
lunch boxes to Mumbai offices informs Aseem Prakash: 
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There used to be huge demand for the food I prepared. However, when the popularity of my food 
affected the business interests of Manjrekar [an upper caste], he went and told everyone that I belong 
to a lower caste. Thereafter, the demand for my food reduced by more than half (2015, 72). 
 
 
The modern power over Dalits is indeed the making-salient of caste and all its social 
judgments and categorizations, through everyday gesture, phrase or phone ring-tone, which 
when it happens amidst the expectation of equal treatment (for example in business, in a college 
or university) is experienced as shocking, humiliating, even traumatic. 23 
Caste identity is also made salient (often, for Dalits, inescapable) by the significance and 
role of caste networks in economic life, including in the caste-differentiation of labour markets 
and businesses. Thus, network-based labour recruitment through gang-leaders and foremen, 
familiar in the colonial mills, railways, factories or plantations and their present-day 
equivalents, including the construction-site and brick-field destinations of ‘super-exploited’ 
seasonal migrant casual labourers (Shah et al. 2018), produce caste-segmented labour forces 
and underline the necessity (or inescapabilty) of categorical membership. 
 
 
 
 
23 Such ‘dignity humiliation’ – the refusal of claims to equality that can be contrasted to the ‘honour 
 
humiliation’ involved in ritual humblings and public enactments of graded status and Dalit inferiority in village 
life (see Lindner 2010) – we have found (in collaborative research led by Sushrut Jadhav, et al. 2016) is a source 
of distress turning universities into places of defeat for ambitious Dalit students or faculty. This has a bearing on 
the tragic death by suicide of talented students in elite institutions which has been a rupture in the narrative of 
casteless modernity. The message Dalits receive is that if they are to be present in a privileged space which is 
not properly theirs (the elite university), it can only be as non-meritorious marked reservations ‘category’ 
persons. For findings on how in Indian universities caste-categorical judgements about capability, worth or 
cultural difference bear on important decisions on friendship, love life, careers (always moderated by other 
factors of class, gender, religion or region of origin) see for example Pathania and Tierney (2018). 
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The equivalent role of caste networks in the control of business is well-known from a history 
in which castes dominant in nineteenth-century trade moved into manufacturing, followed 
(post-1991) by agricultural castes (Damodaran 2008; Chari 2004; Munshi 2016a, 14–15). Caste 
networks are especially important in business regulation where risks are high, formal 
institutions weak and ‘selective trust’ at a premium, whether the low-end, high-turnover 
opportunistic Gujarat garment industry (Harriss 2003), or the high-end diamond industry in 
Mumbai and Antwerp (Munshi 2011). 
Strong caste networks are also a feature of shunned markets where Dalit businesses are 
found, such as leather, sanitary-ware and in the waste economy mentioned earlier, but generally 
Dalit entrepreneurs suffer the costs of exclusion from business networks through which 
information flows giving preferential rates or facilitating the informal transactions with 
officials needed for business (Prakash 2015). Such support networks for business are hardly 
compensated by their own Dalit Chamber of Commerce and Industry24 whose aspiration to 
‘fight caste with capitalism’ mostly speaks to a Dalit business elite far removed from the 
majority, or by reliance on NGOs, or state experiments to diversify government procurement 
(Vidyarthee 2016). 
If we think of caste as a resource, it is perhaps most obviously as durable and wide-reaching 
networks of potential or actual kin offering access (to jobs, business, the state), protection 
(social insurance in crisis), and control (over resources); networks that fall beyond state 
regulation (Munshi 2016b; Hoff 2016). The necessity of caste-belonging is demonstrated by 
the low and stable rate of out-marriage at just five per cent in rural India, and that still 70 per 
cent of educated middle-class Indians marry broadly within caste (Munshi 2014, 2016a; 
Banerjee  et  al.  2013).  However,  the  effectiveness  of  networks  is  variable  across   caste 
 
 
24 http://www.dicci.org/about.php accessed 14 July 2017 
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categories. Deshpande (2018), for example, finds in Delhi that upper-caste secondary school 
graduates who used networks in job searches did better than those who did not; but Dalit 
graduates using caste networks did worse than those who did not. The extent to which Dalits 
are actually disadvantaged by their networks is unclear; and sometimes weak networks lend 
advantage. Luke and Munshi (2011), for example, found that Dalit tea-estate workers in south 
India with weaker caste/marriage networks in their ancestral villages had greater investment in 
education and higher women’s income earning. Sometimes, as Craig Jeffrey et al. (2008) show 
for rural Uttar Pradesh, network-building by educated Dalits is a response to blocked access to 
jobs or business (the case in Alapuram village too). But Dalit networks that are strong 
politically ‘are often weak in terms [of the informal processes that] garner access to markets’, 
capital and jobs (M. B. Das 2010, 331). 
Significanly, Munshi and Rosenzweig show that caste networks also have affects of their 
own. For example, the costs of exiting village caste networks explain India’s low rural-to-urban 
migration (despite high wage differentials) (2009); and networks are strongest when there are 
few outside options, such as those in brokered labour recruitment (Munshi 2014). Moreover, 
external change, such as in the structure of the economy, can impact on, even reverse, the 
positive effect of a caste network, meaning for example that caste networks that facilitated the 
mobility of one generation of Dalit men from villages into formal sector blue collar jobs in 
Mumbai, limited the opportunity of the next, as boys were channelled into network-linked 
vernacular-language schools, excluding them from new white-collar jobs in the post- 
liberalization economy, accessed, in fact, by young women through high-return English- 
medium education (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). 
 
 
Discrimination 
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Occupational ranking, categorical exclusion, opportunity hoarding and the work of networks 
combine in the third caste-effect, discrimination. Consider employment discrimination. It is 
well understood that Dalits face barriers to gaining qualifications within school and university 
systems, including just when the premium to education rose in the post-liberalization period 
(see studies reviewed in Mosse 2018a, 426–28, 431–32); but beyond this, the return on 
qualifications in terms of employment, higher wages or self-employment among Dalits is less 
(M. Das 2013, 1; A. Deshpande 2017, 75–82). Asking why equivalently qualified Dalits are 
less successful points to discrimination, especially in recruitment and role allocation rather than 
wages (ie. different pay for the same work). 
Scholars distinguish different kinds of discrimination – direct/intentional, statistical, 
structural, systemic, institutional – which will not be explained here (see Wrench 2016). Suffice 
it to say that there is good evidence that the Indian labour market discriminates both directly 
on caste identity and on imputed characteristics (statistical discrimination). First, studies using 
fake CVs signalling the social identity of identically qualified candidates find that applicants 
are sorted by would-be employers explicitly by caste, especially in private firms, in certain 
sectors (more so in call-centre than software industry jobs), and when recruiters are male and 
Hindu (Thorat and Attewell 2007; Siddique 2011; Banerjee et al. 2009; Upadhya 2007; M. Das 
2013). It is also clear, second, that the job market implicitly demands of applicants, traits, skills, 
linguistic and cultural competences which the education system does not explicitly give, and 
that come from families transmitting a dominant class-caste culture bundled as individual 
‘merit’ (and indirectly signalled by caste identity) (Bourdieu 1977a, 494; Munshi 2016a, 27). 
Such discrimination then produces caste-differentiated expectations, since upper-caste/class 
graduates experience prejudicial norms and networks as casteless merit, whereas Dalits find 
themselves negatively identified with their caste background at every turn (S. Deshpande 2013; 
A. Deshpande  and  Newman 2007).  These  expectations  contribute  to the  reproduction   of 
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occupational differentiation including through the above-mentioned effect on self-worth (Goel 
and Deshpande 2016). Finally, caste-based discrimination can be produced endogenously by 
markets (Basu 2017). Since much work is interactional, societal prejudice impacts on the 
productivity of those discriminated against, embedding perceived differences of worker 
effectiveness across caste. The market mechanism of competition then itself perpetuates caste 
discrimination. 
In the business economy also, competition feeds direct discrimination, for example when 
Dalit entrepreneurs find that rivals leverage consumer discrimination against them, especially 
in certain sectors such as food (as noted), health and education-related businesses. Aware of 
this threat, a Dalit entrepreneur tells Surinder Jodhka, ‘While most other businesses or 
enterprises are known by the service they provide or goods they sell, our shops are known by 
our caste names …(Chamar’s shop, or factory of the Chuhra)’ (2010, 46). Many try to hide 
their identity (half in Jodhka’s survey of 118 Dalit entrepreneurs in two urban centres of 
Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh). Discrimination more generally contributes to restricted 
Dalit business access to capital or collateral, to premises, infrastructure, raw materials and 
markets, ensuring that while Dalit businesses are diversifying away from stigmatizing activities 
in rural areas, prejudice still enclaves them in urban areas (Jodhka 2010; Iyer, Khanna, and 
Varshney 2013; Thorat, Kundu, and Sadana 2010; Harriss-White, Vidyarthee, and Dixit 2014; 
A. Deshpande 2017, xviii). And in some cases the barriers to self-employment, like those to 
professional careers, contribute to Dalits’ withdraw into unemployment (M. Das 2013). 
The extent of discrimination (like Dalit business access) is uneven across sectors; it is also 
(for reasons still poorly understood) uneven across the country. Loosely speaking, Harriss- 
White et al. (2014) map three regional variants: a ‘northern’ belt with low general business 
activity and low Dalit participation; a ‘central’ belt with high activity and high Dalit 
participation; and a ‘southern’ belt with high business activity but low Dalit participation. State 
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policy, such as on poverty reduction is a poor explainer of this variation, but so are education 
levels, urbanization, growth rates, Dalit political success or anti-caste movements, especially 
of the southern entrepreneurial region having strong discrimination against Dalit business (ibid, 
59). 
In such a context, setting up a business, however small the stall, the salon or the service, may 
be taken a social assertion, as is entering an elite institution and profession; it represents a 
challenge to the implicit attitude that Dalits as a category are expected to be subordinated 
labourers and their entry into privileged occupational spaces is socially transgressive (Harriss- 
White n.d.; Nate Roberts, pers. comm.). The outrage that Dalit economic success or 
competition from below can provoke is manifest in the increasing scale of humiliating violence 
against Dalits, nowadays uploaded onto social media; attacks that are shown by Sharma (2015) 
(using a decade’s crime data 2001-2010) to correlate with narrowing gaps between the standard 
of living of dominant castes and Dalits. 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
What can be concluded about caste in the post-liberalization economy? As seen in the village, 
caste is subject to powerful forces of change. Ideas and practices of markets bring expectations 
of equality, and in many contexts an emphasis on skills, experience and competence have 
replaced the ascriptive characteristics and complementarity of caste. But at the same time (and 
in the same places) caste-based identity, networks, interactions and judgments are unavoidably 
part of the way many markets work, as caste ‘transforms itself as a regulative structure of the 
economy’ (Harriss-White and Vidyarthee 2010, 318). I have mentioned only some of the many 
recent studies of caste effects in sectors ranging from the housing market that caste-segregates 
urban space (Thorat et al. 2015; G. Singh and Vithayathil 2012) to contracting for major road 
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construction (Lehne, Shapiro, and Vanden Eynde 2018). The power of caste as a social 
structure of regulation in the economy, controlling the supply and price of goods, rents and 
labour and influencing the operation of formal institutions and the market, as Harriss-White 
(2003) argues, comes from the fact that the part of the economy that involves the majority of 
people is informal, without regulation by legal-institutional structures of the state. As such, 
these influences ‘remain hardly touched by liberalization’ (2003, 241). They also evade 
attention in the national discourse and political action on caste, as anxieties about success in 
the post-reform economic order continue to focus on affirmative-action reservations, 
mobilizing increasingly militant activism both against reservations and to extend them 
(Deshpande and Ramachandran 2017).25 
It is the character of caste that its effects are experienced quite differently (often inversely) 
by upper castes and Dalits. For Dalits, it has become clear that caste in the economy works as 
a ‘structure of discrimination’ restricting opportunity and deepening inequality (Harriss-White 
and Prakash 2015). In parallel, for others caste works as a structure of advantage (a ‘social 
structure of accumulation’ in Harriss-White's terms [2003, 239]). Indeed, modern caste persists 
in the age of the market because of its advantages – its exclusions are opportunity-hoarding 
gains for others, even though constitutionally and legally caste is only a source of disadvantage, 
never a source of privilege (Subramanian 2015, 296; S. Deshpande 2013, 36). 
 
 
 
 
25 I have reviewed recent work on the effectiveness of affirmative action elsewhere (Mosse 2018a), noting 
 
that given on-going unequal opportunity and market and non-market-based discrimination, the justification for 
current reservations, and their extension to the private sector, would be strong. Counter-arguments that 
reservations perpetuate caste speak more powerfully of the invisibility guaranteed to processes of caste in 
accumulation within ordinary, mostly informal, economic life (Thorat, Naik, and Tagade 2016; S. Deshpande 
2013). 
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As a source of privilege, caste provides ‘favorable categorical memberships and helpful 
connections’ (Tilly 2010, 47). To varying degrees, upper-caste identity embeds privilege (of 
power and control over material and symbolic resources) as a transmissible capacity, as 
Deshpande (2013, 33) puts it, to transform their accumulated ‘caste capital’ into ‘modern 
capital’ (property, higher qualifications, professions etc.). Ethnographic demonstration of this 
is found in Fuller and Narasimhan’s (2014) study of the caste-class privilege of Tamil 
Brahmins, and Subramanian’s (2015) exploration of the role of institutions such as the Indian 
Institutes of Technology (IITs) in manufacturing technical skill/merit from caste privilege. In 
this sense, privileged caste identity offers tangible benefits. Even for those who are without 
power, money or influence, upper-caste identity offers the political advantage of not being 
Dalit – not being at the bottom of the socio-economic order – that gives the poor as well as the 
middleclass a stake in caste discrimination (cf. Harris 1993, 1760). Perhaps, above all, caste 
advantage is the ‘settled expectation of relative [upper-caste] privilege as a legitimate and 
natural baseline’ (ibid, 1714). Cherly Harris (reference to whose work on whiteness here I owe 
to Nate Roberts, pers. comm.) analyses such ‘settled expectation’ as a kind of property; in that 
case ‘whiteness as property’ (Harris 1993). An interest in the protection of unmarked advantage 
(as property) uses putatively objective measures of merit to protect conditions of unfair 
competition in the market so that ‘what is unequal will be regarded as equal in law’ (ibid, 
1777), while ‘the exclusion of subordinated "others" was and remains a central part of the 
property interest in whiteness’ (p. 1758). As Harris suggests, this ‘protection of the property 
interest in whiteness is achieved by embracing the norm of colorblindness’, which ‘denies the 
historical context of white domination and Black subordination’ (1993, 1768). Affirmative 
action, Harris points out, is resisted because it serves to ‘de-legitimate the assumptions 
surrounding existing inequality’ (p. 1778). 
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A loosely parallel property interest in upper-caste advantage is protected through investment 
in claims to castelessness, where accumulated privilege allows self-fashioning independent of 
caste in terms of merit, modernity and middleclassness (S. Deshpande 2013; Mosse 2015, n.d.; 
Vithayathil 2018); while Subramanian observes a self-branding Tamil Brahmin exceptionalism 
that ‘makes [casteless] merit into a form of [Brahmin] caste property’ (2015, 310). The point 
is that upper-caste status confers the capacity to avoid the imposed salience of caste identities 
which are nonetheless invariably detectable if not flaunted (for example through caste 
surnames). As Deshpande puts it, “[u]pper caste identity is such that it can be completely 
overwritten by modern professional identities of choice, whereas lower caste identity is so 
indelibly engraved that it overwrites all other identities” (2013, 32). Dalits who cannot 
anonymously encash caste as advantage, can only deploy it politically in ways that make caste 
hyper-visible in their claims (2013). 
 
 
 
 
Caste as a social structure of the economy 
 
 
 
I began this article by asking what we learn about caste observed from the point of view of the 
modern economy rather than religious ideology or political competition. For one thing, once 
caste is untethered from ‘traditional’ cultural ideas or agrarian order it is easier to observe caste 
in history, as Habib (2002) does, in terms of its capacity to adapt to different social formations 
and labour processes, being itself formed through processes of urbanization, new markets, the 
multiplication of productive skills, technologies, specialists, types of manufacturing and 
commerce, found in the economic transformations of the fourteenth century, as much as the 
nineteenth or  twenty-first centuries. Also in the  historical rear-view are the caste effects    of 
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enabling access to productive resources, markets, education as well as controlling labour, 
lowering wage costs, restricting mobility and containing resistance. 
Considering caste in terms of general social processes such as identity discrimination, 
categorical exclusion and opportunity hoarding, provides a perspective on caste effects today 
that allows comparison with race, ethnicity and other identity-based (and gender-intersecting) 
inequalities.26 Of course, this is entirely compatible with appreciating the significance of 
emergent and enduring cultural values that, for example, underpin the ranking of occupations, 
spaces, markets and people, and that ideas of purity and pollution remain alive in judgements 
and interactions in the market place, as Buswala Bhawani’s (2016) recent work on ‘the bazaar 
and the butchers in Rajasthan’ makes clear. Invoking the metaphor of the network (if not formal 
network analysis, see Mosse 2018, 432) avoids caste as an over-determined, totalizing cultural 
or political concept, or presuming an independently definable caste logic. After all, caste is 
seen to break down and re-form in new ways, and caste networks are ‘cut’ for different 
purposes (Strathern 1996).27 Caste-influenced interactions take genuinely new and 
unanticipated forms, and often interact with, or orchestrate, other processes which include or 
exclude in their own right, and where caste may be absent (or concealed) from actors frames 
of reference. And caste effects may also be lodged within interactional systems as an 
endogenous product of market relations (Basu 2017). As network theorists John Mohr and 
Harrison White put it, ‘institutional resilience is directly correlated to the overall degree of 
structural linkages that bridge across domains of level, meaning, and agency’ (Mohr and White 
 
 
 
 
 
26 On the recent anthropological re-engagement with comparisons of caste and race, see Pandey 2013; Still 
 
2015; Fuller 2011; Roberts 2017. 
 
27 A point made to me by Sara Besky (pers. comm.) 
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2008). And it is this flexibility of caste, not continuity of a particular cultural form or social 
institution, in which lies the resilience of caste. 
What is required is indeed a multi-level view of caste as a social structure of the economy 
made evident at the macro-level through large-sample surveys and at the micro level through 
reflexive observation of interactions that reveal caste-socialised subjectivities, the wider social 
structure being, as it were, incorporated as attitudes, thoughts and historically-embodied 
dispositions –– that is habitus. In Bourdieu’s terms, caste is both part of such subjectivities 
and the social field that produces them with its unequal distribution of material and symbolic 
capital (Bourdieu 1977b, 2000; Swedberg 2011). Also, from Bourdieu, we have a methodology 
which uses ethnographic insight to ground/frame statistical analysis of large data-sets, initiating 
feedback loops between statistical practice and social experience allowing generalization; that 
is discovery of a ‘grammar’ of caste and putting caste society on display (Swedberg 2011; A. 
Deshpande 2017; Mair, Greiffenhagen, and Sharrock 2016). 
Bourdieu, finally, helps us think about the problem of the economy which is not a socially- 
disembedded system of rational homo economicus, certainly not one that can simply be re- 
embedded in social networks. The market economy is, Bourdieu suggests, itself a socially 
constituted ‘system of embodied beliefs’, values, dispositions, tastes, aptitudes, as well as 
categorical belonging and network connections (Bourdieu 2000, 2005);28 and it is one that, in 
India, is not separate from those of caste (with all its intersections with class and gender) in 
that the construction of ‘rational economic agents’ produces systematic discrimination against 
 
28 Bourdieu’s capitalist economy has a subjective-cultural as well as an objective element. ‘Economic 
 
behaviour is influenced by the understanding that people have of their economic actions; and this understanding 
includes values and morality’ (Swedberg 2011, 70, 73). The ‘market’ is ‘the totality of relations of exchange 
between competing agents’ including relations of power, force, and the unequal distribution of capitals that 
make the economic field (Bourdieu 2005, 204 in ibid, 74). 
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lower-caste economic agents who find themselves ‘devoid of the dispositions tacitly demanded 
by [the] economic order’ (2000, 18) to which the upper-caste middle-class are selectively 
adapted. It matters less whether discriminatory effects are intentional, statistical or even 
endogenous, as caste arbitrarily becomes a ‘focal point’ of productivity and coordination in a 
rational market (Basu 2017). 
In other words, Dalits are not discriminated by caste as a set of relations separate from 
economy, but by the very economic and market processes through which they often seek 
liberation through market ‘framings’ (Callon 1998), and through the processes of a social field 
that are concealed (misrecognised) by the pervasive ideologies of the market and its freedoms; 
indeed by the economic habitus that operates as a ‘kind of cultural and social screen between 
the actor and reality’ (Swedberg 2011, 75). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
In recent years, the market economy has become the privileged site for political investment in 
Indian modernity and development. I have argued that the neoliberal framing of social 
transformation separates out caste as a matter of religion/culture or special-interest politics, 
making it harder to acknowledge caste as a social structure of the modern market economy 
itself that works to helps some get ahead, and sorely burdens others; as indeed does the way of 
talking or not talking about caste. 
Obstacles to taking better account of modern processes of caste are to be found in the cultural 
logics which frame the conceptualization of caste and of economy, as well as the construal of 
caste in policy discourse as a residual problem of social disability; but equally in policies that 
focused public attention on caste in the 1990s effectively serving to keep caste in politics and 
out of economics, and the more recent purifications of the    market economy that subcontract 
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caste to culture. In the village, caste has become a less obvious collective frame for social life. 
Economic transactions and mobilities are no longer folded back into public representations of 
caste ritual order (the former site of varied struggles over group status), civility and market 
freedom being the emergent public discourse (behind which caste inequalities dispositions are 
reproduced). Meanwhile, public expressions of caste are deferred onto caste politics – the 
movements or parties that are kept autonomous from everyday economic life now oriented 
towards a widening range of opportunities for which caste, in the different guise of a network 
resource, is mobilized. 
It is the aggregate effects of caste in this form – unobserved by certain fields of scholarship, 
policymaking and actors themselves – that are the focus of recent survey-based research. Such 
research draws attention to some key effects of caste – the occupational and market ranking, 
categorical and networks effects and varied levels of discrimination– that are embedded as self- 
reproducing structures of the Indian market economy. Equally caste as advantage (or a kind of 
property) in the market economy is reproduced through norms and claims of castelessness, that 
place the burden and blame for caste on the disadvantaged groups. This awakens need for new 
tools and concepts to understand contemporary caste processes, to re-think caste, not as one 
thing wholly independent of other relations (such as gender or class) but as identifiable effects 
and processes that require scholarship, especially in relation to the market economy, and 
against the grain of political and policy refusal. 
This is a challenge provoked by the rise of Dalit politics that has shifted concern from the 
colonial disguises of Orientalism to the caste disguises of the market economy; from the 
problem of caste reification, to that of caste refusal. It is a challenge to attend to the continuing 
disjuncture between the public narration of caste as outside the realm of ‘the modern’, and the 
processes of caste which are firmly part of the modern, and which reproduce discrimination 
while denying legitimacy to its public resistance. 
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